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rampstackco/claude-skills/skills/security-baseline/SKILL.md

security-baseline

Establish a security baseline for a website or web app. Use this skill when configuring HTTPS and TLS, setting security headers, planning secrets management, evaluating CSP policies, doing a basic security audit, or hardening a site before launch. Triggers on security headers, HTTPS, TLS, CSP, content security policy, HSTS, secrets management, vulnerability scan, security audit, harden, OWASP, security baseline. Also triggers when a security review is required for compliance or before going live

Source repository stars
779
Declared platforms
0
Static risk flags
1
Last source update
2026-08-28
Source checked
2026-08-28

Decision brief

What it does: where it fits

Establish the security floor for any production website or web app. Stack-agnostic. Covers the things that should be in place before public launch and verified periodically after.

Best for

  • Pre-launch security review
  • Setting up a new site or environment
  • Periodic security audit (quarterly recommended)

Not for

  • Active incident response (use incident-response)
  • Code-level security review (use code-review-web)

Compatibility matrix

Platform support, with evidence labels

PlatformStatusEvidenceWhat to check
CodexNot declaredNo explicit evidencePortability before use
Claude CodeNot declaredNo explicit evidencePortability before use
CursorNot declaredNo explicit evidencePortability before use
Gemini CLINot declaredNo explicit evidencePortability before use
Open the compatibility checker

Installation

Inspect first. Install second.

The source command is displayed only when detected. A safe inspection prompt is always available so your agent can explain every action before execution.

Source-detected install commandSource
npx skills add https://github.com/rampstackco/claude-skills --skill "skills/security-baseline"
Safe inspection promptEditorial

Inspect the Agent Skill "security-baseline" from https://github.com/rampstackco/claude-skills/blob/a67dd34c609f034c0cfd736a348659bbdf1605bf/skills/security-baseline/SKILL.md at commit a67dd34c609f034c0cfd736a348659bbdf1605bf. List every install step, command, network request, credential, file read/write, external action, and rollback step. Explain whether it fits my task. Do not install or execute anything until I approve.

Workflow

What the source asks the agent to do

  1. 01

    Workflow

    Use a free scanner: securityheaders.com, or the MDN HTTP Observatory at developer.mozilla.org/en-US/observatory. Get a current grade. This is the floor. If no scan result can be obtained, state the gap per the data-availability rule.

    Domains and subdomains in scopePublic endpoints (forms, APIs)Authentication entry points
  2. 02

    Step 1: Run a baseline scan

    Use a free scanner: securityheaders.com, or the MDN HTTP Observatory at developer.mozilla.org/en-US/observatory. Get a current grade. This is the floor. If no scan result can be obtained, state the gap per the data-availability rule.

    Use a free scanner: securityheaders.com, or the MDN HTTP Observatory at developer.mozilla.org/en-US/observatory. Get a current grade. This is the floor. If no scan result can be obtained, state the gap per the data-avai…
  3. 03

    Step 2: Inventory the surface

    Domains and subdomains in scope

    Domains and subdomains in scopePublic endpoints (forms, APIs)Authentication entry points
  4. 04

    Step 3: Audit each layer

    Walk the 6 layers. For each, document: - What's in place - What's missing - Risk level (high, medium, low)

    What's in placeWhat's missingRisk level (high, medium, low)
  5. 05

    Step 4: Prioritize

    High risk, easy fixes go first: - HSTS not set - Default headers missing - Admin without 2FA - Old TLS versions enabled

    HSTS not setDefault headers missingAdmin without 2FA

Permission review

Static risk signals and limitations

Network access

medium · line 137

The documentation includes network, browsing, or remote request actions.

Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' https://trusted.com; ...

Evidence record

Why each signal appears

EvidenceSourceComputedTestedEditorial
SignalValueEvidence typeMeaning
Quality score96/100ComputedDocumentation, specificity, maintenance, and trust rules
Repository stars779SourceRepository attention, not individual Skill quality
Compatibility0 platformsSourceDeclared in the catalog source record
Usage guideautomated source guideEditorialGenerated or reviewed according to the visible evidence level

Pinned source

Provenance and original SKILL.md

Repository
rampstackco/claude-skills
Skill path
skills/security-baseline/SKILL.md
Commit
a67dd34c609f034c0cfd736a348659bbdf1605bf
License
MIT
Collected
2026-08-28
Default branch
main
View the original SKILL.md

Security Baseline

Establish the security floor for any production website or web app. Stack-agnostic. Covers the things that should be in place before public launch and verified periodically after.


When to use

  • Pre-launch security review
  • Setting up a new site or environment
  • Periodic security audit (quarterly recommended)
  • Onboarding a new vendor or third-party integration
  • Responding to a security finding or report
  • Hardening after an incident

When NOT to use

  • Active incident response (use incident-response)
  • Code-level security review (use code-review-web)
  • Email-specific authentication (SPF/DKIM/DMARC) (use email-deliverability)
  • DNS-level security (CAA, DNSSEC) (use domain-strategy)
  • Performance-related security (DDoS protection sizing) (use performance-optimization)

Required inputs

  • The site or app in scope (URLs, environments)
  • The hosting platform and CDN
  • Authentication method (if any)
  • Third-party scripts and integrations
  • Compliance context (PCI, SOC2, GDPR, etc., if applicable)
  • Existing security tooling

The framework: 6 layers

Security is layered. Each layer addresses a different attack surface.

Layer 1: Transport security

How data moves from server to client.

  • HTTPS everywhere. No HTTP variants serving content.
  • TLS 1.2 minimum, TLS 1.3 preferred. Disable TLS 1.0 and 1.1.
  • HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header set, with includeSubDomains and preload for high-confidence sites.
  • Strong cipher suites only. Modern browsers handle this if you pick a modern config from your provider.
  • Certificates from a trusted CA, monitored for expiration.

Layer 2: Response headers

What the browser is told about your site.

HeaderPurposeDefault value
Strict-Transport-SecurityForce HTTPSmax-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
Content-Security-PolicyRestrict resource loadingSite-specific
X-Content-Type-OptionsPrevent MIME sniffingnosniff
X-Frame-OptionsClickjacking protectionDENY or SAMEORIGIN
Referrer-PolicyControl referrer infostrict-origin-when-cross-origin
Permissions-PolicyControl browser featuresSite-specific (camera, mic, etc.)
Cross-Origin-Opener-PolicyProcess isolationsame-origin (where compatible)
Cross-Origin-Embedder-PolicyCross-origin restrictionsrequire-corp (where applicable)

CSP deserves its own attention. See the framework section below.

Layer 3: Authentication and authorization

How users prove who they are and what they can do.

  • Strong password requirements (length over complexity rules; allow long passphrases)
  • Account lockout or rate limiting on login
  • 2FA available, required for admin accounts
  • Session tokens: short-lived, secure, HttpOnly cookies
  • Logout invalidates tokens server-side, not just client-side
  • Password reset flows that don't reveal account existence
  • Authorization checked on every request (don't rely on UI hiding)

Layer 4: Input handling

How untrusted input is processed.

  • Validate on the server (client validation is UX, not security)
  • Parameterized queries for any database access (no string concatenation into SQL)
  • Output encoding by context (HTML, JS, URL, CSS)
  • File upload restrictions (type, size, location, scanning)
  • Rate limiting on endpoints that could be abused
  • CSRF tokens on state-changing requests

Layer 5: Secrets management

Where credentials and keys live.

  • No secrets in code, config files in repos, or environment variables baked into images
  • Secrets in a dedicated secrets manager
  • Different secrets per environment (no shared dev/prod secrets)
  • Rotation schedule documented and followed
  • Audit log of secret access
  • Limited blast radius (each service has its own credentials, scoped narrowly)

Layer 6: Operational security

How the team operates.

  • Access controls reviewed quarterly (offboard immediately on departure)
  • 2FA enforced on every admin account (hosting, DNS, registrar, code host, deploy tools)
  • Audit logs enabled and reviewed
  • Vulnerability scanning (dependencies, containers, infrastructure)
  • Patch cadence defined
  • Incident response runbook exists (see incident-response)
  • Backups exist and are tested (see backup-and-disaster-recovery)
  • Security contact published (security.txt at /.well-known/security.txt)

Content Security Policy

CSP is the most powerful response header and the most often misconfigured. Worth its own treatment.

What CSP does

CSP tells the browser which sources are allowed for various resource types: scripts, styles, images, frames, connections, etc. A strict CSP prevents most XSS attacks even when input handling has bugs.

Two flavors

Strict CSP (recommended): uses nonce- or hash- based source allowlists. Inline scripts must be explicitly allowed via nonce.

Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' 'nonce-{random}' 'strict-dynamic'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self';

Allowlist CSP (legacy): lists allowed domains. Easier to set up, much weaker.

Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' https://trusted.com; ...

Strict CSP requires application changes (every inline script needs a nonce). The investment pays off.

Roll out CSP gradually

  1. Start with Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only to log violations without blocking.
  2. Set up a violation report endpoint.
  3. Watch for legitimate violations (third-party scripts, inline handlers).
  4. Tune the policy.
  5. Switch to enforcing mode once violations are mostly false positives.
  6. Continue monitoring violation reports for new issues.

Common CSP mistakes

  • unsafe-inline in script-src. Defeats most of CSP's value.
  • unsafe-eval in script-src. Often required by older libraries; refactor or replace.
  • Wildcard sources (*). Defeats the policy.
  • Allowing CDNs that host arbitrary user content. Attackers can upload scripts to the CDN.
  • Not restricting frame-ancestors. Use this for clickjacking defense (more flexible than X-Frame-Options).

Workflow

Step 1: Run a baseline scan

Use a free scanner: securityheaders.com, or the MDN HTTP Observatory at developer.mozilla.org/en-US/observatory. Get a current grade. This is the floor. If no scan result can be obtained, state the gap per the data-availability rule.

Step 2: Inventory the surface

  • Domains and subdomains in scope
  • Public endpoints (forms, APIs)
  • Authentication entry points
  • Admin interfaces
  • Third-party integrations and their permissions

Step 3: Audit each layer

Walk the 6 layers. For each, document:

  • What's in place
  • What's missing
  • Risk level (high, medium, low)

Step 4: Prioritize

High risk, easy fixes go first:

  • HSTS not set
  • Default headers missing
  • Admin without 2FA
  • Old TLS versions enabled

Medium risk, medium fixes next:

  • CSP rollout
  • Input validation gaps
  • Secret management improvements

Low risk, nice-to-haves last:

  • Permissions-Policy refinements
  • Optional headers (Cross-Origin-* family)

Step 5: Implement and verify

For each fix:

  • Make the change
  • Test in a non-production environment
  • Verify with a scanner
  • Roll out
  • Re-verify in production

Step 6: Set up monitoring

  • Certificate expiration alerts
  • CSP violation reporting
  • Failed login monitoring
  • Unusual admin activity alerts
  • Dependency vulnerability alerts (Dependabot, Snyk, or equivalent)

Step 7: Document the baseline

Write a security baseline document. It says what's expected on every site:

  • Required headers
  • Required configurations
  • Required practices

New sites get audited against this. Existing sites get re-audited periodically.

Step 8: Schedule review

Quarterly is the floor. Add reviews after major changes or incidents.


Common compliance touchpoints

Not legal advice. Surfaces where security baseline meets compliance requirements:

  • PCI DSS (if handling payment cards): much more involved than baseline. The baseline is a starting point, not sufficient.
  • SOC 2: baseline aligns with most CC controls (CC6 series). Documented baseline plus evidence of execution is the audit ask.
  • GDPR / privacy regs: baseline supports security obligations (Article 32). Privacy is broader than security.
  • HIPAA, HITRUST, FedRAMP: baseline is necessary, far from sufficient. Get specialized help.

When compliance applies, the baseline is necessary but not the full answer.


Failure patterns

HSTS without includeSubDomains. Attacker tricks browser into HTTP on a subdomain you haven't HTTPS'd yet.

HSTS preload without commitment. Once preloaded, removing it takes months to reach users through a Chrome update, with no guarantee for other browsers. Don't preload until HTTPS is solid across all subdomains forever.

CSP with unsafe-inline. Defeats most of CSP. Either go strict (nonce-based) or accept that CSP is providing limited protection.

Default headers missing. X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy are easy and free. Set them.

Admin without 2FA. The single most common high-impact vulnerability across small teams. Fix today.

Secrets in environment variables baked into images. Anyone with image access has the secrets. Use a runtime secret manager.

No security.txt. Researchers find issues; they need somewhere to report. Publish a security.txt at /.well-known/security.txt.

Old TLS versions enabled. Disable TLS 1.0 and 1.1. Most providers offer this as a checkbox.

CDN allowing arbitrary inline scripts via misconfigured CSP. The CDN proxies user content; attackers leverage that. Audit the CSP against actual loaded resources.

No incident response plan. When (not if) something happens, no runbook = chaos. See incident-response.

Vulnerability scanning without remediation. Reports pile up. The scan is theater unless someone fixes findings.

Penetration test ignored. Pen test report sits on a shelf. Test results without remediation are worse than no test.


Output format

A security baseline document includes:

  • Inventory: what's in scope
  • Layer-by-layer status: what's in place, what's missing
  • Required headers: with values, applied per environment
  • Required configurations: TLS, secrets, auth
  • Required operational practices: access reviews, patch cadence, audit logging
  • Findings: prioritized list of gaps
  • Remediation plan: owners, dates
  • Re-audit cadence: when this is reviewed next

If required data is unavailable

This skill's output depends on data, measurements, or tool results it cannot generate on its own. When a required input, tool, or data source is unavailable or unverifiable, the sanctioned output is the deliverable with the gap stated: what was needed, what was actually obtained or verified, and which parts of the output are affected. Fabricating, estimating, or interpolating a required number to complete the deliverable is never sanctioned. A stated gap is a complete answer.


Reference files

Frequently asked questions

What to verify before installation and use

What does the security-baseline source document cover?

Establish the security floor for any production website or web app. Stack-agnostic. Covers the things that should be in place before public launch and verified periodically after.

How do I install security-baseline?

The source record exposes this install command: npx skills add https://github.com/rampstackco/claude-skills --skill "skills/security-baseline". Inspect the command and pinned source before running it.

Which permission-related actions were detected?

Static rules flagged network in the source; the page lists the matching lines and excerpts.

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